Josh Hendrickson has an interesting New Year’s Day post on Economic Forces today. He reviews the term cooperation costs as proposed by Earl Thompson in a 1982 paper: Underinvestment Traps and Potential Cooperation. Hendrickson uses Thompson’s framework to discuss a breakdown or perceived breakdown in optimal investment in three scenarios. Each one offers a unique combination of the collective and private forces at work in the creation, penalty or use of a public good.
Let’s fit the first story about a mine, a port, and a road into the context I propose here at Home Economics. Instead of considering the whole landscape within a single system, break the system into groups, each with a mainspring to action. The mine is a profit-oriented venture. Its existence depends on the collection of actors that make up its workforce and investors, all of whom share an interest in extracting a private gain from their involvement. The group of people involved in the port’s operations is in a similar situation. The road is different. It is an infrastructure open to all nearby residents as well as those travelling for commercial needs. Roads are most often paid for by the larger group, as it is beneficial to most that their use remains open, even to the lowest payees. Even though members of GrMine and GrPort are also members of GrRoad, it is safe to assume the last group is significantly larger than either of the first two.
Earl Thompson’s model posits that the potential cooperation cost is the expense borne by investors in the mine and the port, along with the state, of communicating and bartering to secure the construction of the road. This happens at a fixed point in time, and once it is done, there are no more cooperation costs. Hence, the thought that those who come later free ride on the use of the road.
I propose to look at each group separately. Amongst the members of each group, there are shared social concerns. The ability to get to work on a good road may be one amenity of value. Yet the benefit of the new road for the mine workers may be a different value than the port workers, again depending on distances or substitutes that each set has access to. The municipality ( county/state or government structure of choice) is composed of a population that also should perceive a benefit from the road. However, this could be, on a per-person basis, of much lower value.
One of the three groups could be comprised of a population that is willing to pay for the entire road, as it is that valuable to them. If the mine is so remote, and the port area already has suitable transportation infrastructure in place, then in order to get employees out to the mine and product in from the mine, the mine might find it suitable to bear most of the expense. Or there could be some suitable combination. But the calculation involves each individual who must act for the enterprise to succeed.
There is also the possibility that the overarching group creates additional costs as members resist the new road due to costs not borne by either the mine group or the port group. If the road goes through a residential neighborhood, then the projected traffic noise has a negative impact on the residents, lowering their property values. In this communication stage of the project, their resistance to cooperation could be seen in city council meetings as voices of objection. Thompson’s model does not allow for outside resistance. Sorting by groups and their interests clarifies how costs are borne and hence who may sabotage cooperation.
There are all sorts of combinations of coordination costs between these three groups that could make it more worthwhile for one or the other to front the bill. We see developers putting in roads to provide access to a new development. We see municipalities investing in infrastructure to attract businesses. All of these choices are dependent on the particular situation and point in time. To say that those who come later take advantage of the cooperation costs of those who come before isn’t accurate, as the system is dynamic. They may not have paid for the cost, but they were not a part of any of the benefits of the original decision-making either.
The other factor facilitated by the sorting into groups is the time factor. The set-up time to open a mine is bound to be different than to complete a road. And what type of road are we talking: dirt, gravel, or asphalt? The reality is that these projects live over varying time spans. This factors into the decision to cooperate. Cooperation costs are not a single fixed cost, but a time-indexed stream of costs and benefits, discounted differently by each group.
The structural issue, for the purpose of analysis, is that the individual actors, reacting to their own concerns, reveal shared concerns with members of their group. The degree of this value plays into the cooperation costs of settling with outside parties on their shared interests. Thompsonโs cooperation costs assume a fixed set of beneficiaries; once group membership, veto players, and time-path asymmetries are introduced, the free-rider interpretation no longer holds.









































































